

Message Text

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MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT

NASA FOR KRUEGER

E. O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM
SUBJ: ASAT TALKS: BUCHHEIM STATEMENT OF JUNE 13, 1978

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMB. BUCHHEIM
AT MEETING OF ASAT TALKS ON JUNE 13, 1978:

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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BUCHHEIM
JUNE 13, 1978

MR. AMBASSADOR,

OUR MEETINGS SO FAR HAVE RAISED SEVERAL POINTS WHICH
BOTH OUR DELEGATIONS HAVE CONSIDERED AND DISCUSSED. HOWEVER,
AS WITH ALL DISCUSSIONS OF THIS KIND, THERE ARE POINTS WHICH
NEED FURTHER ELABORATION.

WE PREVIOUSLY HAVE EXPRESSED TO YOU THAT OUR GOAL IN THESE DISCUSSIONS IS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT THAT WILL LIMIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS, ELIMINATE ANY EXISTING ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS AND PROHIBIT SUCH ACTS AS DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION OF SATELLITES. WE BELIEVE NEITHER SIDE SHOULD HAVE AN ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM.

DURING OUR LAST MEETING, YOU TOUCHED ON SEVERAL CONTINGENCIES INVOLVING THE CONDUCT OF POSSIBLY UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES BY MEANS OF SATELLITES, AND YOU ASKED WHETHER IN OUR VIEW AN OBLIGATION NOT TO COMMIT HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST SATELLITES WOULD EXTEND TO SATELLITES PERFORMING ACTIVITIES WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED UNLAWFUL.

WE NOTE YOUR STATEMENT THAT, BY RAISING THESE QUESTIONS, YOU DID NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT STATES SHOULD DEVELOP ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS BUT RATHER THAT YOU WERE SEEKING OUR VIEWS AS TO WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SUCH CONTINGENCIES. IN THE U.S. VIEW, THE HYPOTHETICAL POSSIBILITY THAT STATES MIGHT USE SATELLITES FOR UNLAWFUL PURPOSES DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE DEVELOPMENT, DEPLOYMENT OR USE OF AN ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM.

STATES ARE OBLIGED TO CONDUCT THEIR ACTIVITIES IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE INTEREST OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING. THE 1967 OUTER SPACE TREATY ALSO PROVIDES THAT
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IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, STATES SHALL BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND SHALL CONDUCT ALL THEIR ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE WITH DUE REGARD TO THE CORRESPONDING INTERESTS OF ALL OTHER STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY. AS A PARTY TO THE OUTER SPACE TREATY, THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS IN THIS REGARD, AS WE ARE SURE THE SOVIET UNION IS.

IT IS, OF COURSE, POSSIBLE THAT AT SOME TIME OR ANOTHER A STATE MIGHT UNDERTAKE AN ACTIVITY IN OUTER SPACE WHICH SOME OTHER STATE MIGHT CONSIDER UNLAWFUL OR OTHERWISE UNACCEPTABLE. IN SUCH CASES, THE STATE CONCERNED WOULD BE OBLIGED BY THE U.N. CHARTER TO SETTLE ANY DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND IN SUCH A MANNER THAT INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY WERE NOT ENDANGERED. ANY STATE CONDUCTING HARMFUL OR UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES WOULD BEAR INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY FOR THOSE ACTIVITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OUTER SPACE TREATY, THE LIABILITY CONVENTION, AND OTHER RELEVANT AGREEMENTS.

IT WOULD OF COURSE BE DESIRABLE TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF UNLAWFUL OR OBJECTIONABLE ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE BY REACHING AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE

CONDUCT OF THOSE SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES MOST LIKELY TO CREATE DIFFICULTIES OF THIS NATURE. WE HAVE ALREADY DONE THIS IN CERTAIN AREAS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN CONNECTION WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. AND WE CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD AGREEMENTS IN OTHER AREAS WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE. WE BELIEVE THAT DIFFICULTIES OF THE KIND YOU MENTIONED ARE UNLIKELY TO ARISE BECAUSE, AS I HAVE NOTED, THE STATES CONCERNED HAVE RECOURSE TO MEANS OF AGREEING ON THE GUIDELINES FOR THOSE ACTIVITIES.

IN ANY EVENT, WHILE ONE CAN ALWAYS POSTULATE ANY NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES, WE BELIEVE THAT NO SERIOUS SITUATIONS EXIST AT THIS TIME AND THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO ARISE IN THE NEAR
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FUTURE. IN OUR VIEW, THERE WILL BE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO SUCH SITUATIONS IF THEY SHOULD TAKE ON CONCRETE FORM OR POSE TANGIBLE DIFFICULTIES IN THE FUTURE. THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER IS THE IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF AN ARMS COMPETITION IN ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS. IT IS THIS DANGER TO WHICH WE SHOULD DIRECT OUR EFFORTS.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS TESTED ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS FOR MANY YEARS. IT SEEMS TO US THAT AS THESE TALKS PROCEED WE CAN FIND MUTUALLY AGREEABLE SOLUTIONS TO INSURE THAT SUCH SYSTEMS ARE NOT NEEDED. THE U.S. SIDE CONTINUES TO HAVE THE FIRM VIEW THAT BOTH SIDES CAN BE MORE SECURE WITHOUT POSSESSING SYSTEMS FOR DAMAGING OR DESTROYING SATELLITES. WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON THIS.

CONCERNING THE TESTING OF ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS, IN THE VIEW OF THE U.S. SIDE, ONE OF THE PRINCIPLE ELEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WOULD BE A BAN OF TESTING AGAINST OBJECTS IN SPACE. AS AN INITIAL STEP IN THAT DIRECTION, THE U.S. SIDE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SUSPENSION OF TESTS OF ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS AND THE MANNER IN WHICH SUCH AN IDEA MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A SUSPENSION, IN THE CONTEXT OF THESE TALKS, WOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO THE AVOIDANCE OF AN ANTI-SATELLITE RACE. FURTHER, IN OUR VIEW, ABSTENTION FROM SUCH TESTING WOULD REINFORCE THE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEING TO LIMITS ON ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS ON THIS IDEA.

AT OUR LAST MEETING, AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV, YOU STATED THAT OUR TWO SIDES HAD AGREED THAT WITH RESPECT TO VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF ANY AGREEMENT WE MAY REACH, NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WOULD BE USED MOSTLY, AND INSPECTION ON THE SPOT WAS EXCLUDED. THE U.S. SIDE IS PREPARED TO AGREE, WITH REGARD TO A SUSPENSION OF TESTING IN
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CONNECTION WITH THESE TALKS, THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WOULD BE USED FOR VERIFICATION OF SUCH SUSPENSION. ON THE OTHER HAND, VERIFICATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT MIGHT REQUIRE COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO SUPPLEMENT THE USE OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

TODAY I HAVE RESPONDED TO YOUR REQUEST FOR OUR VIEWS ON UNLAWFUL ACTS AND OUR VIEWS ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF SUCH CONSIDERATIONS TO ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS; AND WE HAVE INTRODUCED THE IDEA OF A SUSPENSION OF TESTING OF SUCH SYSTEMS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR RESPONSE.

I BELIEVE THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS I HAVE PRESENTED TODAY SHOULD HELP TO CLARIFY THE APPROACH OF THE U.S. SIDE TO THE MATTER UNDER DISCUSSION. THE U.S. DELEGATION HOPES THAT YOU WILL GIVE US YOUR COMMENTS AND REACTIONS SOON IN ORDER TO MAKE THESE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS AS USEFUL AND PRODUCTIVE AS POSSIBLE. RIDGWAY. UNQUOTE VANCE

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